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Grey v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 11 (Mar. 13, 2008)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – SIXTH AMENDMENT/CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
Summary 
 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction pursuant to a jury verdict. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The Court announced a new rule that parties who intend to present expert rebuttal witnesses must 
provide notice of the expert rebuttal witnesses to the other party. Here, the prosecution’s failure 
to provide such notice was not found to be plain error requiring reversal. However, the Court 
also found that the State must duly file an allegation of habitual criminality before a defendant 
may be sentenced as a habitual criminal under NRS 207.010. Because the prosecution had not 
done so in this case, the Court vacated the sentence and remanded. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
On March 19, 2005, James Grey approached an acquaintance, Tracie Fryer, and asked her for a 
ride in her car. Fryer refused, but when Grey jumped into her passenger seat uninvited, she 
finally agreed to give him a ride after picking up some friends. Fryer testified that Grey seemed 
agitated and complained that someone had spiked his beer and tried to rob him. After Freyer 
picked up her friends, Grey also claimed he had a gun in his possession. Eventually Grey 
threatened to throw Fryer out of the car and steal it. At that point, Fryer pulled into a gas station 
and entered a convenience store, accompanied by her friends. When Grey also got out of the car, 
Fryer and her friends reentered the car and attempted to drive away without him. Grey then 
jumped onto one of the running boards and smashed a window, causing Fryer to stop the car. Her 
friends retreated into the convenience store while she remained behind talking to Grey. A short 
time later he grabbed the ignition key and broke it. Fryer then reentered the store. 
A store employee who had witnessed the events transpiring had called 911. When police arrived, 
Grey retreated to the back of the store, grabbing Fryer around her neck and making a motion as if 
he were reaching into his waistband. He started yelling that he was going to kill one of the 
pursuing police officers. The police were finally able to take Grey into custody after tazing him 
several times. 
Upon his arrest and transportation to the Clark County Detention Center, Grey repeatedly asked 
the detention medical staff to test him for drugs. He claimed that someone had spiked his beer 
earlier that day, and he attributed his behavior to the spiked beer. The medical staff did not 
perform any manner of drug test on Grey. During this time, Grey began to preach about a 
revolution, and as a result of this preaching he was placed in the psychiatric ward at the detention 
center. While there, he continued to preach, refused to eat, and stood in front of his door 
completely naked. Grey claimed he had never been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, or any other mental illness. 
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Ultimately he was charged with false imprisonment by using a person as a human shield. His 
defense at trial was that he had been involuntarily intoxicated at the time the alleged crime was 
committed. He introduced an expert witness, Dr. Krelstein, who testified that Grey’s actions on 
the day of the crime were the result of involuntary intoxication, opining that his behavior 
indicated Grey was on PCP, and that PCP was soluble in water. On cross-examination, he 
admitted that he did not know whether Grey was on methamphetamine that day, and that his 
theory was only valid under the assumption that Grey did not voluntarily consume something. 
The state then called an expert rebuttal witness, Dr. Karagiozis. The state’s notice of witnesses 
did not include any expert rebuttal witnesses, though Grey’s notice stated that Dr. Krelstein 
would testify on his behalf. 
Grey objected to Dr. Karagiozis’ testimony on the ground that he was not qualified to render an 
opinion on mental health, drug abuse, or involuntary intoxication. Grey’s counsel was allowed to 
examine Dr. Karagiozis outside the jury’s presence to determine his qualifications as an expert 
witness. The state then again offered Dr. Karagiozis as a witness. The district court asked the 
defense if they had any objections, and they said that they did not. Thus, Dr. Karagiozis was 
allowed to testify as an expert rebuttal witness. 
Dr. Karagiozis testified that PCP would not have caused Grey to act in that manner, and that, 
depending on the form of the PCP, it would have either taken a very long time to dissolve or 
would have bubbled over immediately. Further, he testified that the only tasteless drugs Grey 
could have been given, GBH and Rohypnol, would have caused him to pass out within thirty 
minutes. He ultimately opined that Grey’s behavior the day of the crime was inconsistent with 
being under the influence of PCP “or any mind altering drug.”2 
On cross-examination, Dr. Karagiozis admitted that he had not reviewed Dr. Krelstein’s reports, 
police reports, grand jury statements, or witness statements. He also testified that he did not 
specialize in psychiatry. He nevertheless opined that there was no evidence, other than Grey’s 
own testimony, that Grey was under the influence of anything the day of the crime. 
Grey was found guilty of false imprisonment by using a person as a human shield. Subsequently, 
he was sentenced as a habitual criminal under NRS 207.010(1)(a) despite the state’s failure to 
formally file such an allegation. Grey appealed. 
 
Discussion 
Grey appealed his conviction under four separate grounds: failure of the state of notify defense 
of its intent to call an expert rebuttal witness; insufficiency of the evidence as proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of Grey’s guilt; the state’s failure to gather exculpatory evidence (i.e. 
administer a drug test); incomplete jury instructions; and lack of jurisdiction to be sentenced as a 
habitual criminal. 
Notice of Expert Rebuttal Witness 
 Grey argued that the state should be required to notify a defendant of its intent to call 
expert rebuttal witnesses under the Due Process Clause.3 Thus, to the extent that NRS 174.234 
does not require such disclosure, Grey argues that it is unconstitutional. 
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The Court found that the language of NRS 174.234 does not require such disclosure, and 
effectively requires a defendant to disclose any rebuttal experts within imposing the same duty 
upon the state. Given this nonreciprocal burden imposed upon the defendant, the Court agreed 
with Grey that the statute is unconstitutional. The Court relied on a Supreme Court case, Wardius 
v. Oregon, for the rule that, without a strong state interest to the contrary, parties in criminal 
cases must be afforded reciprocal discovery.4 The Court found no such strong state interest here, 
nor did it find the state had shown why its intent to call Dr. Karagiozis as an expert rebuttal 
witness was not certain prior to the trial. Ultimately, the Court promulgated a new rule: “once a 
party in a criminal case receives notice of expert witnesses, the receiving party must provide 
reciprocal notice if the party intends to present expert rebuttal witnesses.”5  
Despite this finding, the Court determined that, in Grey’s case, the failure to provide notice of 
the expert rebuttal witness did not constitute reversible error because Grey did not object to Dr. 
Karagiozis’ testimony on the ground of failure to give notice, and Grey did not show how further 
preparation, given such notice, would have affected the outcome of the trial. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Grey argued that the state did not provide sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he intended to violate Fryer’s personal liberty, or that he intended to use her as a human 
shield. 
The Court found that, given convenience store security tapes, witness testimony, and Fryer’s 
grand jury testimony, the state did provide sufficient evidence such that any trier of fact could 
have found all the elements of the crime were met beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Failure to Perform a Drug Test 
Grey argued that the state failed to gather exculpatory evidence when the detention center 
medical staff refused to administer a drug test upon Grey’s admittance. He claimed such a test 
was material to his defense because it would have revealed what substance caused him to behave 
the way he did, and would have allowed the expert witnesses to better analyze his behavior. 
The Court found that Grey failed to show a reasonable probability that there would have been a 
different result had the drug test evidence been available. The evidence would not have been 
material because, even if it revealed a controlled substance in Grey’s substance, it would not 
have shown whether Grey’s intoxication on the substance was voluntary or involuntary. 
Jury Instruction as to Involuntary Intoxication 
Grey argued that the involuntary intoxication jury instruction was incomplete because the Court 
did not sua sponte add duty-to-acquit language. Grey based his contention on cases decided after 
his conviction.  
The Court stated that “retroactivity of [a] new rule is . . . only applicable when the issue has been 
preserved for appeal.”6 Thus, because defense counsel did not preserve the issue for appeal, the 
new rule was not retroactive. The Court then went on to find that even if the rule was applied, the 
incomplete jury instruction would constitute harmless error because, based upon its review of the 
record, a rational trier of fact would still have found Grey guilty absent the error. 
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Habitual Criminal Under NRS 207.010 
Grey argued that because the state failed to file a notice of habitual criminality the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to sentence Grey as a habitual criminal under NRS 207.010. The statute 
requires the state to formally file such a notice prior to a sentencing hearing. Here, the state 
claimed it did file the notice, but the record reveals it was merely faxed to defense counsel and 
never formally filed with the district court. Further, the indictment did not contain any allegation 
that Grey was a habitual criminal. 
The Court agreed that a defendant may not be sentenced as a habitual criminal under NRS 
207.010 unless the state has first duly filed an allegation of habitual criminality. Therefore, it was 
plain error for the district court to sentence Grey as a habitual criminal when the state had not 
filed such an allegation. The Court vacated Grey’s sentence as a habitual criminal and remanded 
the matter for a new sentencing hearing. 
 
Conclusion 
When a party in a criminal case receives notice of expert witnesses, the receiving party must 
provide reciprocal notice to the opposing party if the receiving party intends to present expert 
rebuttal witnesses. 
